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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the nullification of homo juridicus and the
vanishing of the jurist in relation to the liberal global-order
project and the emergence and spread of soft-networked channels
of post-national governance. By inquiring into the shift from the
individual’s active will to the sterile behavioural schemes
prompted by the universalisation of liberalism and economic
analysis of social interactions, it will be argued that the jurist and
the (rule of) law are no longer needed in a post-national system of
rational and mechanic causations. Through an analysis of Susan
Sontag’s and Josef Esser’s accounts for and against the
interpretative task, it will be contended that the re-discovery of the
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anthropological and onto-sociopolitical function of the jurist
depends upon the re-affirmation of: (1) the will’s oscillation
between velle and nolle as constitutive of human uniqueness; (2)
the need to interpret homo juridicus’s will power normativistically,
and what this power leads to.
“ . . . in willing and, correspondingly, in not willing, we bring ourselves to
light;
it is a light kindled only by willing.
Willing always brings the self to itself”
Martin Heidegger
Nietzsche, [1961] 1991, 51
“ . . . the culture of inwardness, the intensification of personal conflicts in
human life,
and the pent-up expressive power of its artistic representation is gradually
becoming alien to us”
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century, [1962] 2008, 111
“Freedom becomes a problem, and the Will as an independent autonomous
faculty is discovered,
only when men begin to doubt the coincidence of the Thou-shalt and I-can”
Hannah Arendt
The Life of the Mind, [1971] 1978, Vol II, 63
“Reason is not self-defining”
Paul W. Kahn
Out of Eden, [2006] 2010, 175
“. . . according to Christian theology there is only one legal institution
which knows neither interruption nor end: hell.
The model of contemporary politics–which pretends to an infinite economy
of the world–is thus truly infernal
Giorgio Agamben
The Church and the Kingdom, [2010] 2012, 41
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I. INTRODUCTION1
I have been criticising the liberal global-order project for some
time now.2 While investigating the structural relationship between
the Law & Finance doctrine used by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank,
and the sterile administrative and economic-oriented aspatial
ufficium of global governance as opposed to that of political
government, my efforts have been particularly focused on what I
perceive as the two main features of this universalist (non-)
dimension: (1) despite what may be argued regarding the
accommodating essence of global pluralism,3 which is ultimately
1. This paper stems from my participation in the Conference “DeJuridification: Appearance and Disappearance of Law at a Time of Crisis,” IVR
International Association of Legal and Social Philosophy, UK Branch, held at
the Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science on
October 25, 2014, and in the Graduate Legal Research Conference “Divergence
and Dissent in Legal Globalization,” held by Católica Global Law School,
Lisbon, on September 19, 2014. At both conferences I presented the paper
entitled The Age of “Depoliticization” and “Dejuridification” and its “Logic of
Assembling”: An Essay against the Instrumentalist Use of Comparative Law’s
Geopolitics”, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 215 (2015) [hereinafter The
Age of “Depoliticization”].
In addition to the two anonymous reviewers, I would like to thank a number of
friends and colleagues for their valuable comments and criticism on an earlier
draft. In particular, I am indebted to Maksymilian Del Mar, William E Conklin,
Christoph Antons, John Morss, and Michael Stokes. The usual disclaimer
applies.
2. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of “Depoliticization”, supra note 1;
Siliquini-Cinelli, Hayek the Schmittian: Contextualising Cristi’s Account of
Hayek’s Decisionism in the Age of Global Wealth Inequality, 24(4) GRIFFITH L.
REV. (2015) forthcoming;
3. For an introduction, see GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3–28 (Gunther
Teubner ed., Dartmouth 1997); More recently, see PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICS
(Emilios Christodoulidis & Stephen Tierney eds., Ashgate 2008); CONCEPTS OF
LAW (Seán Patrick Donlan & Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler eds., Ashgate 2014)
[hereinafter CONCEPTS OF LAW]; LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY (Richard
Nobles & David Schiff eds., Ashgate 2014).
Global pluralism’s alleged attitude is double-rooted in liberalism’s misleading
belief in the perpetual inclusive capacity of endless negotiations and in the
pluralist branch of the sociological study of democracy, which erupted in the
early post-war period and which was aimed at linking realist theories of society
with normative models of regulative democracy. Habermas defines it in terms of
“sociological enlightenment,” in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, 329–87 (Polity Press 2014) (1992) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS].
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rooted in the misleading belief that “[g]lobalisation does not imply
homogenisation,”4 the totalising Oikoumene is characterised by the
uniformity of (non-)politics, (non-) culture, and (non-)legislation in
the Western (and in particular, Anglo-American) standardisation of
local and particular forms of cultural sensibility5—which means
that we should rather speak of global (non-)law;6 (2) the global
4. WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 89
(Cambridge University Press 2000). See contra SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER (Simon &
Schuster 1996); See also what was pointed out by Bowden and Seabrooke,
namely that “global standards of market civilization are based on a global
normalization of liberal positivism,” in GLOBAL STANDARDS OF MARKET
CIVILIZATION 10 (Brett Bowden & Leonard Seabrooke eds., Routledge 2006)
[hereinafter GLOBAL STANDARDS]. For a recent point of view on global order
issues, see HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER (Penguin 2014).
5. Dyzenhaus’ claim that Rawls’ homogenous society “involves, by and
large, getting rid of pluralism [in politics],” should be investigated within this
perspective. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 231
(Clarendon 1991). This passage was reprinted, in part, in “Putting the State Back
in Credit,” in THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT 75–91 (Chantal Mouffe ed.,
Verso 1999) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT], where Dyzenhaus
adds that the discipline of public reason wanted by Rawls “is supposed not so
much to displace politics as to suppress it altogether,” at 84; See also Žižek’s
notion of “post-politics” in Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics in
CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT, id. at 30. François Ost is of the same view, as it
emerges when he argues that “globalised law . . . results from a much more
radical perspective of transnational penetration, the result of more-or-less
spontaneous convergence of national laws seeking to align themselves with
standards and models that are dominant or seductive,” in Law as Translation in
THE CULTURE AND METHOD OF COMPARATIVE LAW 69–86, at 77 (Maurice
Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., Hart Publ’g, 2014). For an introduction, see PAUL
W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (Princeton Univ. Press 2008)
[hereinafter LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE]. For a historically contextualised
perspective, see CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 214–94 (Gary J.
Ulmen trans., Telos 2006) (1950) [hereinafter NOMOS OF THE EARTH]; Gary J.
Ulmen, Pluralism Contra Universalism, 31:5 SOCIETY 32 (1994).
6. The term ‘global (non-)law’ has also been used by Marc Amstutz in
Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary Jurisprudence 9 GERMAN
LAW JOURNAL 465 (2008).
In this regard, at first glance it might seem that we already live in the
“community” for whose coming Agamben argued more than twenty years ago
after the fall of the “bipolar system” and in which neither commonality nor
identity is a condition of belonging because “[t]he coming being is whatever
being.” Yet upon closer look, it emerges that such a community is yet to come
as the formation of such a community requires an absolute—that is, exceptional
and sovereign—act of simultaneous ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ (a destituent
potential, as Agamben defines it). The limit of this solution, however, is that its
key features are purely metaphysical – and Agamben is aware of that. See
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order scheme may not be considered a territory in spatioontological terms and, consequently, there is no need in it for a
nomos in terms of “division”, “allocation”, and “appropriation”
(Nahme) of rights, interests, obligations, and duties; that is to say,
by being made up of (non-)boundaries, global (non-)law rejects
law’s anthropological and ontological need for a tangible
signature.7 The unification of these two components leads, I
maintain, to the nullification of the Schmittian sovereign,
exception, and concept of the political.
Within the same perspective, the present contribution argues
that in our dehumanised global age, legal interpretation will be
less-frequently required because the jurist’s anthropological and
onto-sociopolitical function will increasingly no longer be needed.
This is so, I will contend, because in the post-national setting8—in

GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE USE OF BODIES 269–73 (Adam Kotso trans. Stanford
University Press 2016); See also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY
1, 67 (Michael Hardt trans., Univ. Minn. Press 2013) (1990) [hereinafter THE
COMING COMMUNITY]. See also AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END (Vincenzo
Binetti & Cesare Cesariano trans., Univ. Minn. Press 2000) (1992); Agambem,
Special Being in PROFANATIONS 55–60 (Jeff Fort trans., Zone Books 2007);
AGAMBEN, THE SACRAMENT OF LANGUAGE 69–72 (Adam Kotso trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2010). For a theological inquiry into the managerial and
administrative paradigm of the oikonomia, see AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND
THE GLORY (Lorenzo Chiesa & Matteo Mandarin trans., Stanford Univ. Press,
2011). The reasons why this paradigm found a decisive ally in the imperialist
age were queried by HANNAH ARENDT in THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM
123–302 (Harvest Books 1973) [hereinafter ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM].
Not surprisingly, in trying to shape the political task of our generation, Kahn
correctly urges us to “think critically about our own claims for universal norms”,
a necessity due to the fact that “Western aspirations for a single global order are
not universally accepted.” KAHN, supra note 5, at 2. For a more juridical
account, see WILLIAM E CONKLIN, STATELESSNESS (Hart Publ’g 2014). See also
FLEUR JOHNS, NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press
2013).
7. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa: For a (Post-)Schmittian
Decisionist Theory of Law, Legal Reasoning, and Judging, 39 AUSTRALIAN J.
LEGAL PHIL. 118 (2014) [hereinafter Imago Veritas Falsa]; Siliquini-Cinelli, The
Age of “Depoliticization”, supra note 1.
8. Scholarship on post-national issues is seemingly endless. Any
investigation on this topic should at least consider GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2009); NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Oxford Univ.
Press 2012); BEYOND TERRITORIALITY (Peer Zumbansen, Günther Handl &
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which (non-)humans neutrally behave rather than willingly act and
in which cultures are no longer “mapped” through the (legal)
traditions that express them via definition of identities—the
political relationship between the law and those it tries to protect
by imposing respect for itself and/or stimulating that respect is
neutralised. What we are witnessing is, then, the breaking up of
homo juridicus as a type of homo whose performative volitions
need the law’s normative placet.
According to Alain Supiot,9 homo juridicus is a type of homo
characterised by “reason”10 and who acquires and protects his/her

Joachim Zekoll eds., Brill 2012); George Pagoulatos & Loukas Tsoukalis,
Multilevel Governance in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
62–75 (Erik Jones, Anand Menon & Stephen Weatherill eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2012) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]; Vivien A. Schmidt, Democracy
and Legitimacy in the European Union in OXFORD HANDBOOK, id. at 661–75;
Adrienne Héritier, Policy Effectiveness and Transparency in European Policy
Making in OXFORD HANDBOOK, id. at 676–89; ADRIENNE HÉRITIER, POLICYMAKING AND DIVERSITY IN EUROPE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); Héritier,
New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political Capacity and Policy
Effectiveness? in THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 105–26 (Tanja A. Börzel
& Rachel A. Cichowski eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003); Héritier, New Modes of
Governance in Europe: Policy-Making Without Legislating? in COMMON
GOODS 185–207 (Adrienne Héritier ed., Rowman & Littlefield Pubs 2002);
Adrienne Héritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl, The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes
of Governance 28 J. PUB. POLICY 1 (2008); Gráinne de Búrca, Robert O.
Keohane & Charles F. Sabel, Global Experimentalist Governance, New York
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, #485 (2014);
DEMOCRACY AND CRISIS (Benjamin Isakhan & Steven Slaughter eds., Palgrave
MacMillan 2014); TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Michael Head, Scott Mann
& Simon Kozlina eds., Ashgate 2012); EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin eds., Oxford Univ.
2010) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EU]; RULING THE
WORLD (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Tratchman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2009); GLOBAL STANDARDS, supra note 4; CRITICIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(Markus Lederer & Philipp Müller eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2005);
GLOBALIZATION AND LAW FROM BELOW (Boaventura de Sousa Santo & César
Augusto Rodriguez-Garavito eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press 2000);
GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds.,
Routledge 2000).
9. ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS (Saskia Brown trans., Verso, 2007).
See also Maksymilian Del Mar, Book Review: Homo Juridicus: On the
Anthropological Function of Law, 5 LAW, CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES 325–
29 (2009); Robert Knox, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of
Law, 17:2 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 286–99 (2009); See also Peter Goodrich,
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own humanised identity by performing within his/her own
biological and symbolic dimensions. The law plays a pivotal
anthropological role in this process because, Supiot claims, it helps
homo juridicus to differentiate him/herself from what s/he is “not”
and “should not be.” Supiot seems to realise that Kojéve’s HegeloMarxist post-historical (that is, animal) condition, with its
apolitical and legally neutral essence and unstable non-substance,
is what would remain should the anthropological function of the
law not meet this challenge. In addition to several aspects of labour
law, of which Supiot is a leading scholar, the so-called “civilising
mission” of the contract is also investigated throughout his book in
support of his claim.
Supiot’s account, while fascinating, is affected by a primary
conceptual paradox that, unfortunately, weakens it. Indeed, while
warning us against the dehumanising trend of the mechanical
global-order project, Supiot expends much effort in criticising the
model of the individual promoted by the schemes of standard
economic analysis, according to which people do not act, but
behave. Yet, as he admits while quoting Dumont, “in reality actual
men do not behave; they act with an idea in their heads . . . .”11
Although Supiot correctly warns us against the “humanitarian”
façade of globalisation,12 he seems to underestimate this existential
feature of mankind, and, by arguing for the possibility of a homo

Interstitium and Non-Law in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 213, 213 (Pier
Giuseppe Monateri ed., Edward Elgar 2012) [hereinafter METHODS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW]; Goodrich, Law’s Labour’s Lost 72 MODERN L. REV. 296
(2009).
10. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at ix.
11. Id. at 99. David Nelken is of the same idea, as it emerges when he notes
that “social life consists of action rather than mere behaviour,” in Puzzling Out
Legal Culture: A Comment on Blankenburg in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES
69–92, at 75 (David Nelken ed., Darthmout 1997) [hereinafter COMPARING
LEGAL CULTURES].
12. On this, see also KAHN, supra note 5, at 135–36. The fact that Kahn
himself, who is director of a worldwide centre for human rights, claims that “the
human rights movement [is] a new form of global politics—the liberal politics
of reason—[that] has virtually nothing to say” is truly astounding. Id. at 136.
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juridicus who reasons, he actually offers a neo-Kantian notion of
“persons”13 that supports both economic models of rational
behaviour and the dehumanised essence of liberalism.14 The
contemporary post-national globalising trend, and the “irresistible
progress of technology”15 that underpins it, may therefore
paradoxically find a valuable ally in Supiot’s account.
The definition that best addresses homo juridicus’s nature is, I
contend, quite different. As I shall explain in Section II, homo
juridicus is, to me, a type of homo who acts instead of behaving
and does so because of the performative instances of his/her
willing ego rather than because of some interest- or reasonoriented scheme of social interaction. I argue this because our
existential power to (per-)form our volitions is rooted in the
essence of the conflict that takes place within our sovereign powerto-will while we are deciding both “for” and “against” a future
project (as Plotinus and Hegel would agree). Hence, the act of
(per-)forming our choices is what defines both the essence of
willpower and the existential uniqueness of mankind. This was
clear to Augustine who, in On the Free Choice of the Will,
13. As we shall see in due course, according to Kant, beings who act under
the maxim of the “categorical imperative” are “rational beings . . . called
persons.” See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 55 (Lewis White Beck trans, Library of Liberal Arts 1997) (1785).
14. The relationship “reason-law” has been understood since philosophy
began to be constitutively involved with the law—that is, since Socrates’ trial
and Plato’s meeting with Dionysius in Sicily. The rationalisation of society
brought about by modernity gave it new life. Any investigation on its modern
essence should at least deal with HANS BLUMEMBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
MODERN AGE (Robert M. Wallace trans., MIT Press 1983) (1966); JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, Vols I and II (Polity
Press 2004, 2006) (1981)[hereinafter THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION];
HABERMAS, ON THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (Shierry Weber Nicholsen &
Jerry A. Stark trans., MIT Press 1994) (1988) [hereinafter LOGIC OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES]; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 3; ANTHONY
W. PRICE, CONTEXTUALITY IN PRACTICAL REASON (Oxford Univ. Press 2008);
NEIL MACCORMICK, LAW, STATE AND PRACTICAL REASON (series) (Oxford
Univ. Press 1999–2011); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND
REASONING (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2012); LUC J. WINTGENS, LEGISPRUDENCE: PRACTICAL REASON IN LEGISLATION
(Ashgate 2012); see also infra note 51.
15. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at 39.
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explained how in his youth he turned from reason to will to form
his character and who, as Arendt has correctly pointed out,
believed that “the freedom of the Will draws exclusively on an
inner power of affirmation or negation that has nothing to do with
any actual posse or potestas.”16 Framed in these terms, homo
juridicus is a type of homo characterised not by the unspontaneous
potentiality of reason (or desire), but by the immanence and
freedom of the volo me velle, which makes him/her decide “for”
and “against” something or someone according to the power of
affirmation or negation of the self. If the above is correct, the
authority of the jurist’s activity of jus-dicere (or rule-telling) is
then rooted in the sociopolitical need to, first, normativistically
interpret the individual’s active will and then, through the
formulation of (and answer to) a quaestio juris, hold “that”
individual (and, thus, as we shall see, man qua man as opposed to
“Man”) accountable for the consequences of his/her sovereign
choice.
This type of willing homo, and thus the existential need for
having a legal expert who actively interprets and encapsulates the
meaning of his/her doing within law’s regulative instances,17 are
disappearing. Put bluntly, this means that the jurist is disappearing.
This was also true, at least in part, in the civil law tradition during
the modern era, when, with the exception of Germany, the
constructivist, political dicta of the Leviathan as absorbing
magnum-artificium (or magnus homo) determined the victory of
the ratione Imperii over that of the imperio rationis and displaced

16. HANNAH ARENDT, 2 THE LIFE OF THE MIND 88 (Harcourt 1978) (1971)
[hereinafter 2 LIFE OF THE MIND]. Elaine Pagels carefully investigates the role
that Augustine played in changing the Christian perspective on freedom and
willpower in ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT 78–150 (Vintage
Books 1989) (1988).
17. See the notion of “interpretation” in the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
according to which “interpretation is the action of explaining the meaning of
something.” Emphasis added; see also STEFANO BERTEA, THE NORMATIVE
CLAIM OF LAW (Hart Publ’g 2009).
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the jurist from the picture (auctoritas non veritas facit legem).18 On
the contrary, in our (post-post-modern or neorealist?19) globalised
age, both the willing homo juridicus and the jurist make no
appearance because of the working scheme of the global “civil
society,” which is an apolitical and legally neutral soft-networked
worldwide web of more-or-less autonomous associations that
openly binds (non-)humans20 together in matters of “common”
concern. This intangible and illimitable web works according to
the destructuralised mechanisms of what is known as post-national
governance (PNG).
What I claim in this paper cannot be evaluated without a
knowledge of how soft-networked and intangible schemes of PNG
work. Unfortunately, a full description of them is beyond the
parameters of this contribution. It will have to suffice to highlight
that the PNG model is that of a neutral administration of
(non-)human affairs that is ultimately aimed at transcending the
forms of politics and law through which the modernisation of the
world was achieved (and unsuccessfully protected) over the last
two centuries. The term “soft-networked interaction” basically
signifies that every level of governance “spontaneously”
collaborates with each other by operating on an equal basis of
“output” legitimation and accountability (the so-called Roman
strategy21).
I will return to PNG’s features in Section II. What should be
noted now is that, law being a phenomenon that precedes the state,
“legal hybridity” is a fascinating term that the (globalised) jurist
has used to, or at the very least tries to, overcome the limits that
affect the recursive thinking of the neo-Kantian debate on the
18. I discussed this in Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
See also TIMOTHY MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE? (Oxford Univ. Press
1997); JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
19. See FRANCA D’AGOSTINI, REALISMO? (Bollati Boringhieri 2014).
20. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE OPEN (Kevin Attell trans., Stanford Univ.
Press 2004) (2002).
21. LUUK VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE 223, 229, 252–73
(Liz Waters trans., Yale Univ. Press 2013) (2009).
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nature of the law (see Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Raz, and, in part,
Dworkin) and thus makes sense of his/her essence in this liquid
scenario.22 Unfortunately, while trying to face this wave of
juridical nihilism (in which s/he became “an unwitting tool, a link
in a chain of events that [s/he does] not see as a whole”23) by
accommodating his/her functionalist anthropological and
sociopolitical existential needs, the jurist has made (at least) two
terrible mistakes. First, the jurist did not pay enough attention to
the recursive motion of the strategy followed by the liberal globalorder project, whose “occult” essence cannot be revealed without a
comparative inquiry between, on the one hand, liberal
individualism and its belief in the never ending potentiality of
reason and, on the other hand, the aesthetic, subjected
occasionalism and metaphysics of absolute individualism24 that
characterised the romantic attitude and that were aimed at opening
the “self” to a world of illimitable and interchangeable
(non-)realities.25 Second, in trying to take back the role of which

22. For an introduction, see KEITH C. CULVER AND MICHAEL GIUDICE,
LEGALITY’S BORDERS (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). The discussion undertaken at
the conference “Stateless Law: The Future of the Discipline,” which was held at
McGill University in September 2012, has provided useful insights on this: see
STATELESS LAW, EVOLVING BOUNDARIES OF A DISCIPLINE (Helge Dedek &
Shauna Van Praagh eds., Ashgate 2015). On the notion of “liquid society,” see,
in addition to Zygmunt Bauman’s works, LIQUID SOCIETY AND ITS LAW (Jirí
Pribán ed., Ashgate 2007).
23. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 63 (Routledge
2013) (1973, 1976, 1979). See also NATALINO IRTI, NICHILISMO GIURIDICO
(Laterza 2005). I share Roger Cotterrell’s belief that “the juristic issue is how
the idea of law can survive in the socio-historic conditions it faces,” in The
Jurist’s Conscience: Reflections Around Radbruch, THE ANXIETY OF THE JURIST
13–26, at 24 (Maksymilian Del Mar & Claudio Michelon eds., Ashgate 2013).
24. Think, for example, of Fichte’s absolute ego and philosophy of science,
and Schelling’s philosophy of nature and notion of external reality.
25. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL ROMANTICISM (Guy Oakes trans., MIT Press
1986) (1919); SCHMITT, ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM (Gary L.
Ulmen trans., Greenwood Press 1996) (1923); SCHMITT, HAMLET OR HECUBA
(David Pan & Jennifer Rust trans., Telos 2009) (1956); PAUL DE MAN, THE
RHETORIC OF ROMANTICISM (Columbia Univ. Press 1984); DE MAN,
ALLEGORIES OF READING 135–301 (Yale Univ. Press 1979). See also HANNAH
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38–49 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998) (1958)
[hereinafter HUMAN CONDITION]; finally, see LAW AS POLITICS (David
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the nation-state, with the aforementioned exception of Germany,
has deprived him/her, the jurist has instrumentally supported the
global-order plan by using the same Legendrian “logic of
assembling”26 through which the Leviathan has neutralised the
authority of legal reasoning and that inevitably implies an a priori
deconstruction.
The dissolution of the nation-state and of its sovereignty as a
principle of political and juridical unity has provoked several
reactions. Two of them are of particular interest here because they
have led to two completely opposite scenarios—the justification
and the total displacement of the jurist’s function. The first
scenario, aimed at protecting the state by making sense of its legal
authority in the globalised network, makes a claim for the
empirical impossibility of fully achieving the form of the nationstate. What should be achieved, it posits, is rather what should be
called the “cosmopolitan” state. Given that globalisation, in
Glenn’s words, “represents the inevitable challenge to the
instruments of closure of the contemporary state,”27 the only form
of state that may accommodate civil society’s pluralistic instances
is that of a cosmopolitan (non-)Leviathan. This is so because the

Dyzenhaus ed., Duke Univ. Press 1998); JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL
SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 46–57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
26. PIERRE LEGENDRE, L’OCCIDENTE INVISIBILE (CE QUE L’OCCIDENT NE
VOIT PAS DE L’OCCIDENT) 41 (Paolo Heritier trans, Edizioni Medusa 2009)
(2004). My translation. See Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of “Depoliticization”,
supra note 1.
On the relevance of Legendrian thought to legal discourse, see LAW AND THE
UNCONSCIOUS (Peter Goodrich trans. & ed., Palgrave MacMillian 1997); LAW
AND THE POSTMODERN MIND (Peter Goodrich & David G. Carlson eds., Univ. of
Mich. Press 1998); LAW, TEXT, TERROR (Peter Goodrich et al. eds., Routledge
2006).
27. H. PATRICK GLENN, THE COSMOPOLITAN STATE 165 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2013). Glenn goes further and clarifies that “[f]actual globalization not
only surpasses the institutional capacities of state hierarchies, it also transcends
the physical boundaries of states,” id. at 170. See also id. at 172–80 for a
compelling summary of the various approaches to cosmopolitism. In particular,
see Held’s argument for a “cosmopolitan citizenship” in DAVID HELD,
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (Stanford Univ. Press 1996).
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so-called “internal aspect” of socio-legal rules,28 and thus their
rational acceptance by the participants in the soft-networked realm,
would benefit from this shift. More precisely, although Glenn
admits that “the cosmopolitan theory has not produced easily
identifiable results,”29 he nevertheless suggests that, in light of how
the “cosmopolitan character of the contemporary state also
explains much of its present operation,”30 “[o]ur thinking of the
contemporary state can . . . be facilitated by awareness of its
cosmopolitan character”.31 A similar claim is made by William
Twining, who argued for the urgent necessity of a “cosmopolitan
discipline of law,”32 and by Paul Berman, who, in describing the
limits of sovereigntist territorialism and universalism, opted for a
tertium comparationis, namely “cosmopolitan pluralism.”33 All
these views share some elements with those aimed at uniting the
benefits of inter-connected channels of PNG with the ante-factum
legitimation and post-factum accountability working logic of those
forms of progressive constitutionalism34 in which the state is not a
mere “bystander” that observes what other private, public, and
28. It was Hart who coined the notion of the positivistic and state-oriented
“internal aspect of law,” by which he meant that law’s social recognition (also)
depends on its appeal to reasonable acceptance. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (1961). See also Adam Perry,
The Internal Aspect of Social Rules, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2015).
29. GLENN, supra note 27, at 172.
30. Id. at 291. It is noteworthy that, despite what may be contrarily thought,
a similar point was made decades ago by Schmitt in Ethic of State and
Pluralistic State in CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT, supra note 5, at 195–208.
See also ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 140–44 (Duke Univ.
Press 2004); DYZENHAUS, supra note 5.
31. GLENN, supra note 27, at 291.
32. WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 3 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2009).
33. PAUL BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 10–1 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2012). See also id. at 12–3. For a recent account of Berman’s inquiry, see
Michael Giudice, Global Legal Pluralism: What’s Law Got to Do With It?, 34:3
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 586 (2014).
34. Luca
Siliquini-Cinelli,
Legal
Pluralism
and
Progressive
Constitutionalism: An Introduction to the South African Challenge for PostNational Governance, 2 J. COMP. L. IN AFRICA 1 (2015). See also Laurence R.
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
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hybrid actors achieve and/or fail to achieve; rather, the state is seen
as a political “ally”, or an entrepreneur35—as a co-protagonist risktaker.
The second reaction has instead led to the complete rejection of
any forms of legal authority as expressed by the social contract
theory (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant). This is done with the aim
of establishing, through the adoption of a post-structuralist theory
of unconventional legitimation, the beginning of a new ontological
anarchism that “contends that the law has no binding claim on our
obedience”36 by refusing “the founding of the law [and] invok[ing]
. . . the ethical and political disruption of all legal authority.”37 Yet,
notwithstanding this fascinating claim that anarchy “is the very
condition for doing politics in an ethical way,”38 the proposed
model of society can never be achieved. This is so because, once
the absolute foundations of normative power are neutralised
through the “deconstruction or displacement of . . . essential
identities,”39 the new order would depend entirely upon the belief
in “the autonomous, voluntary and cooperative relationships that
are found in everyday social relations”40 which, to serve the
anarchic cause, would be extended to utopic limits.
35. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE (Anthem Press
2013).
36. Saul Newman, Anarchism and Law: Towards a Post-Anarchist Ethics of
Disobedience, 21 GRIFFITH L. REV. 307, 315 (2012). See also the whole Volume
21, No. 2 of the GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW entirely dedicated to Law and Anarchy:
Legal Order and the Idea of a Stateless Society.
37. Id. at 321.
38. Id. at 327.
39. Id. at 323.
40. Id. at 321. This becomes even more evident when anarchists themselves
admit that “[i]f an anarchist ends up in front of a judge, presumably [s/he] will
want a good lawyer,” id. at 327. In this sense, a true form of real anarchism is
that which took place in Italy in the 1970s, when the terrorists of the so-called
Brigate Rosse refused any form of legal assistance during the several trials in
which they were condemned. This led to a very delicate situation in which the
rule of Article 24 of the Italian Constitution (according to which legal defence is
an inviolable right) could not be complied with. The existential crisis of the
judicial system and the rule of law culminated in the threatening (and sometimes
killing, such as in the case of Advocate Fulvio Croce, in Turin) of the lawyers
who were “forced” to provide legal assistance to the “red” activists. The more
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Delving into this debate, this paper proposes an alternative
strategy through which one can (try to) challenge the threat posed
to the sociopolitical need for and authority of the jurist in the
current soft-networked globalised scenario. My claim, which
stands in evident opposition to both liberalism’s mechanic
rationalisation of human conduct41 and Tamanaha’s belief that law
“has no essence,”42 is that for the jurist to defeat the current
nihilism which affects his/her role, a metaphysico-ontological turn
must be made: from the (non-)human who rationally behaves
according to scientific schemes of social interactions to the human
who willingly (and politically) acts and whose decisions must be
normativistically interpreted. Only through the individual’s reappropriation of his/her willpower—that is, the power to decide
both “for” and “against” different possible scenarios—will the
jurist’s jus-dicere come back to act as a medium between society’s
anthropological need for sociopolitical order and coordination, and
law’s performative instances.
To put it differently, the decisive anthropological and ontosociopolitical relationship between jus-dicere and the individual’s
active will is what jurists should look for while trying to visualise
and make sense of both (the rule of) law’s organising ideal and its
claim to regulative power in a globalised era characterised by

accurate and accessible description of what happened in those years is to be
found in GIORGIO GALLI, PIOMBO ROSSO (Baldini Castoldi Dalai 2007). On the
unavoidable intrinsic “evilness” of mankind, see, in addition to Baudelaire’s and
Dostoyevsky’s works, PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN (Princeton Univ. Press
2010) (2006) [hereinafter OUT OF EDEN]; SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN
THOUGHT (Princeton Univ. Press 2002); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND
CIVILIZATION (Vintage Books 1988) (1961). For a different notion of evil in
terms of a dehumanised and “banal” consequence of the rise of bureaucratic
schemes of administration, see HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM
(Penguin Books 2006) (1963).
41. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 63 (George Schwab trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 2005) (1922, 1934); KAHN, LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra
note 5 and OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 53–60; KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY
175 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter POLITICAL THEOLOGY].
42. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND
SOCIETY 193 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
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multiple and conflicting non-exclusive and non-supreme claims of
authority43 (and in which, as a consequence, the very essence of a
primordial and supreme constitutive power is nothing but
obsolete).44 I believe that the only way through which the jurist
may effectively take back the leading role of which the
universalisation of liberalism (and in particular the idea that
governments should build or reform their institutions to regulate
economic activities according to rational global standards
determined by outsiders) has deprived him/her is the re-affirmation
of the immanence of the decisive and active function of people’s
willing faculty and of the corresponding need to make sense of it in
normative terms. Strictly speaking, this means that we, as lawyers,
should effect a “conceptual shift” and opt for a Heideggerian
backward method of comprehension that will lead us to understand
the essential authority of (the) law by inquiring into and exploring
the existential authority of the jurist, and not vice versa.
This is what this paper tries to do by addressing the essence of
legal interpretation (and, thus, at least in part, legal hermeneutics)
through the analysis of two opposite accounts: Susan Sontag’s
essay “Against Interpretation” and Josef Esser’s defence of the
interpretative task in his Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der
Rechtsfindung.45 In particular, Section II investigates the
relationship between the individual’s sovereign will and the role of
43. Bas van der Vossen, Legitimacy and Multi-Level Governance in NEW
WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 233–53 (Maksymilian Del Mar ed., Palgrave
Macmillan 2011); Nicole Roughan, The Relative Authority of Law: A
Contribution to “Pluralist Jurisprudence”, id. at 254–74; EMMANUEL
MELISSARIS, UBIQUITOUS LAW: LEGAL THEORY AND THE SPACE FOR LEGAL
PLURALISM (Ashgate 2009).
44. A comparison between the aforementioned scheme of “Roman
strategy,” which characterises PNG’s system of post-factum legitimation and
accountability, and Robespierre’s “Immortal Legislator” as a perpetual source of
authority still needs to be done. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 176–77
(Penguin Books 2006) (1963).
45. Respectively, SUSAN SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION AND OTHER
ESSAYS (Picador 2001) (1966), and JOSEF ESSER, PRECOMPRENSIONE E SCELTA
DEL METODO NEL PROCESSO DI INDIVIDUAZIONE DEL D IRITTO 112–37 (Salvatore
Patti & Giuseppe Zaccaria trans., ESI 1983) (1972).
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the jurist in providing it with a legal meaning along with the
current displacement of both, caused by the universalisation of
liberalism; in Section III Sontag’s and Esser’s inquiries will be
compared; concluding remarks will appear in Section IV.
II. THE LIBERAL GLOBAL-ORDER PROJECT: FROM ACTION TO
BEHAVIOUR
What this paper claims could be summarised as: that law’s
essence should be inferred from its existential force—that is, from
the jurist’s function. As a comparatist, I fully agree with Geoffrey
Samuel when he says that the considerable body of work produced
by jurists on the definition and nature of law is “less helpful” to the
comparatist “than might first appear.”46 Nonetheless, it is precisely
my comparative experience that tells me that the law can keep its
regulative promises only if the jurist can count on it to interpret
decisively the active power-to-will of homo juridicus whilst
inferring the rule from the norm, as Paul suggested.47 This is why,
as I will argue in Section III, legal interpretation is the canon of
jus-dicere, that is, “to tell what is the law.”48 Importantly, this is
why, as Schmitt, Derrida, and, more recently, Agamben and Kahn
have persuasively argued while inquiring into the political sin of
legal positivism and liberalism, the law is the product of both the
norm and the decision.
The nullification of the individual’s will brought about by (the
universalisation of) liberalism49 and the ideal of a self-regulating
46. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions
from the Sciences and Social Sciences in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 34–77, at 36 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., Hart Publ’g 2004)
[hereinafter EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY].
47. Cf. Digest, 50, 17, I: Regula est quae est breviter enarrat. Non ex regula
ius sumatur, sed ex iure quod est regula fiat. This reciprocal need leads to the
(unanswerable) question of whether it is humans who control (and need) law, or
law that controls (and needs) humans (non sub homine sed sub [Deo et] lege).
See also infra note 58.
48. Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
49. Kolakowski correctly spoke of the “self-destructive potential of
liberalism” while describing “the process by which the extension and consistent
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(global) society in which (non-)humans behave according to
“mathematical symbols of economic equations, which require
persons to be grasped simply as contracting units,”50 renders the
activity of jus-dicere obsolete. To understand this dissolving
phenomenon completely entails that we first understand that to
assess human action in terms of rationality is misleading because
to speak of “rational choice”51 or “purposive-rational action [in
which] behaviour is guided by technical rules”52 is nothing but an
oxymoron. If reason, in Kahn’s words, “is not self-defining,” it is
application of liberal principles transforms them into their antithesis.” See,
respectively, The Self-Poisoning of the Open Society and Irrationality in Politics
in LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 162–75, at 162–163
and 192–203 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).
50. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at 96. The behavioral model of social interaction
recalls Nietzsche’s “mathematical faith” in a world “reduced to a mere exercise
for a calculator.” See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 335 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1974) (1882). The fact that the global
governance framework is administrated through “indicators” is a powerful
testament to this. See GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS (Kevin Davis, Angelina
Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2012).
On how the law and economics approach examines (non-)legal rules as a
working system, see Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi, Quantitative Methods in
Comparative Law in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 9, 306–16;
Parisi & Luppi, Comparative Law and Economics: Accounting for Social Norms
in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 92–104 (David S. Clark ed., Edward Elgar
2012); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal
Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUBLIC CHOICE 419–33 (2003). See also
FRANSCECO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW MAKING (Oxford
Univ. Press 2009).
51. See, among others, MARTIN HOLLIS, REASON IN ACTION (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996). For a broad introduction on the “will-reason” dichotomy, see
KAARLO TUORI, RATIO AND VOLUNTAS: THE TENSION BETWEEN REASON AND
WILL IN LAW (Ashgate, 2010).
The fact that John Finnis uses the antithesis between “commensurability” and
“incommensurability” (which are two technical terms used in mathematics and
physics—that is, two sciences in which the individual makes no appearance) to
make a claim for the possibility of rational choice is the maximum expression of
the fallacy that affects the notion that reason can act. See Practical Reasoning in
Law: Some Clarifications, now in JOHN FINNIS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 353–73, at
358 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011); See also supra note 14. The same fallacy affects
Habermas, according to whom “[t]he law presents itself as a system of rights
only as long as we consider it in terms of its specific function of stabilizing
behavioural expectation.” HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 133. Emphasis added.
52. HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 46. See also
infra note 154.
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simply because rationality informs our behaviour, not our actions.
We do not decide when we behave because our will, and thus the
conflict between velle and nolle, does not appear in behavioural
procedures. This conflict only arises when we are free to both
make a decision and act accordingly. The fact that the decision is
(and cannot be anything but) the outcome of such a conflict makes
it clear that only the power-to-will, that is the power to (per-)form
our uniqueness by making choices, is self-defining. This is why
will’s autonomy can transcend the power of reason. Heidegger’s
discussion of Scheler’s account against the “objectification of acts”
and Greek and Christian components of traditional anthropology,
along with his explanation of Dasein’s resoluteness, is what we
should look at to fully understand this phenomenon. It will then
become evident that, despite what is commonly argued, to say that
Oedipus is not evil because he makes “rational choices” would be
misleading. On the contrary—in opposition to the Old Testament’s
Cain, who decides according to his power-to-will and then acts,
Oedipus is not evil because he does not choose at all but merely
behaves.
The constitutive force of human uniqueness lies within the
anthro-sociopolitical essence of the self’s power of affirmation or
negation through willing action. The homogenisation of
sociopolitical practices through the neutralisation of local
sensibilities and ways of expression brought about by the
Westernisation of behavioural standards is aimed at dissolving the
internal conflict that generates this unique force. Avowedly, the
connections among our power of affirmation or negation, human
plurality, and action was clear to Arendt. While explaining why
“distinctness” and “otherness” should not be considered the same
thing and why in humans they get fused together to become
“uniqueness”, Arendt remarkably claimed that “[i]f men were not
distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is,
was, or will ever be, they would neither need speech nor action to
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make themselves understood.”53 This then led her to claim that
“human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.”54
Not surprisingly, the shift from “input” to “output” forms of
(non-)legitimation and (non-)accountability in which the
experimentalist architecture of inter-connected channels of PNG is
rooted is one of the main components of the current dissolution of
what makes us human.55 If to act, as the etymological essence of
the Greek word archein reveals, is “to set something into motion,”
from the anthropological point of view, this constitutive beginning,
as Arendt has persuasively claimed,56 is the beginning of
“somebody” in his/her “uniqueness”. Hence, if action is the
manifestation of the sovereign decision that creates, as God did,
something ex nihilo—from nothingness—as Schmitt (and Bergson)
correctly understood,57 and in so doing determines who we are, it
is quite evident that in the uniformed and dehumanised post53. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 175–76. See also id. at
41.
54. Id. at 176.
55. See supra note 8. I do not agree with Sabel and Zeitlin’s suggestion that
experimentalist forms of (European) PNG are the product of human action and
therefore arose from Adam Ferguson’s third class of social phenomena.
EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EU, supra note 8, at 9.
56. ARENDT, supra note 25, at 177. See also HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN
PAST AND FUTURE 155–63 (Penguin Books 2006) (1961). Arendt quotes twice,
in both THE HUMAN CONDITION and THE LIFE OF THE MIND, Augustine’s insight
that “[i]nitium ut esset homo creatus est,” id. and supra note 16, at 158. See also
Michael A. Wilkinson, Between Freedom and Law; Emilios Christodoulidis &
Andrew Schaap, Arendt’s Constitutional Question; and Jan Klabbers, Hannah
Arendt and the Languages of Global Governance in HANNAH ARENDT AND THE
LAW 35–61, 101–14, 229–47 (Marco Goldoni & Christopher McCorkindale
eds., Hart Publ’g 2013).
57. In Schmitt’s words, the “constitutive, specific element of a decision is,
from the perspective of the content of the underlying norm, new and alien.
Looked at normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness.” See SCHMITT,
supra note 41, at 31–2. In CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, Schmitt further maintains
that “[a] constitution is not based on a norm [but] on a political decision
concerning the type and form of its own being, which stems from its political
being.” See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125 (Jeffrey Seitzer
trans., Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928). See also Hannah Arendt, Lying in
Politics in HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 5 (Harcourt 1972)
[hereinafter CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC], when it is claimed that “[i]n order to
make room for one’s own action, something that was there before must be
removed or destroyed, and things as they were before are changed.” See also
infra note 74 and note 161.
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political framework of “civilised economy” in which the spatiality
of local identities, sensibilities, and cultures is dissolved and the
constitutive force of man’s uniqueness is nullified, there is no need
for “input” forms of sociopolitical regulation. Being the postnational “constellation” the (non-)dimension in which the
sovereign, active will as the source of political (self-)creation is
neutralised, revolutions and constitutional process of “input”
political legitimation are no longer needed in it. In other words,
(universalised) liberalism displaces the irreducibility of foundation.
As a result, the authority of the jurist to give a normative
meaning to our choices and to hold us accountable for what we
decide to do or not to do plays no role in a uniformed
(non-)dimension, such as that of the liberal global order, in which
social rules are distortedly confused with legal norms,58 and in
which its participants never actively decide “for” or “against”
something or someone because they all behave according to
reason- or interest-oriented schemes of interaction. This is why the
sterile structures through which the post-national framework is
administered neutralise the anthropological and onto-sociopolitical

58. I agree with Alan Watson that “[t]he core of law is authority,” in Legal
Culture v. Legal Tradition, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY, supra note 46,
1–6, at 2. In this sense, amongst all possible differences, what matters here is
that, whilst conducting a theological inquiry into how the concept of “will”
evolved alongside the operative understanding of the concept of “being” in
terms of form-of-life, Agamben has demonstrated that the norm does not
necessarily need two or more parties perform its claims. See GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, THE HIGHEST POVERTY (Adam Kotso trans., Stanford Univ. Press
2013) [hereinafter HIGHEST POVERTY]; AGAMBEN, OPUS DEI (Adam Kotso
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter OPUS DEI]. See also AGAMBEN,
THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 3–12. Blankenburg has correctly
noted that the incredible confusion between the legal norm and social rules has
led to believe in the exact opposite myth, namely that “legal rules are rooted in
social norms.” See Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures in
COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 11, 41–68, at 64. See also SOCIAL
AND LEGAL NORMS (Matthias Baier ed., Ashgate 2013). See also supra note 47.
Gordon Woodaman denies that law is a specific field of social reality: see
Gordon Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate
About Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998). Contra, see M.
Croce, Is Law a Special Domain? On the Boundary Between the Legal and the
Social in CONCEPTS OF LAW, supra note 3, 153–68.
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function of jus-dicere: the jurist, the (rule of) law,59 legal
interpretation, and analysis broadly understood, are no longer
needed in a soft-networked system of rational and mechanical
causations characterised by the never-ending apolitical
performance of collective platforms of “regulatory” peer-review
dialogue that lack any form of supervision (and in particular that
offered by the “principal-agent” model).60
That said, a question comes to mind: if the activity of the jurist
only makes sense in a sociopolitical scenario in which the
individual’s sovereign will manifests itself by actively making
choices, why (and how) did liberalism and its globalisation
displace willpower in favour of reason? The answer is that
liberalism needed to carry out this shift in order to make its
strategy succeed. Once the inner power of affirmation or negation
of the self, which, according to Augustine, constitutes the freedom
of the will, is completely annihilated, the empty space left by this
revolutionary operation can be easily filled by behavioural
schemes of rational, social interaction. This is not surprising.
Augustine is, as Arendt has correctly noted,61 “the first
philosopher” of the will. His task was to uncover the cause of evil
through the transformation of Paul’s “two laws” (the Old Law
which says “thou shalt do” and the New Law which says “thou
shalt will”62) into the two wills (I-will and I-nill) which lies at the
59. For an introduction to the dichotomy of “post-national governance-rule
of law,” see KRISCH, supra note 8, at 276–96. For a brilliant account of the
“social deficit” in the rule of law, see Timothy A. O. Endicott, The Impossibility
of the Rule of Law, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1999).
60. My claim that soft-networked channels of PNG are rooted in
liberalism’s infinite rationalistic openness cannot be understood, and eventually
criticised, without bearing in mind that “[t]he centrality of reason means that
liberal practice and liberal theory are continuous activities.” KAHN, supra note 8,
at 14. Emphasis added.
61. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 84–110.
62. Id. at 84. As we shall see below, Paul’s revolutionary introduction of the
spiritual willing ego was meant to provide humankind with the freedom to
choose whether or not to fulfill the Messianic message while neutralising the
social divisions and conditions imposed under Hebrew and Roman law (cf., for
instance, Romans 3:11, 3:19-20, 7:7, 8:11, and 10:4; Corinthians 7:20-23 and
29-32), and in so doing, defeat man’s finitude and death (cf. Acts 24:21). To
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bottom of men’s internal conflict from which the choice between
velle and nolle arises.63 With the aim to eliminate the individual’s
volo me velle and unpredictability of its presentifications (which is
precisely what our uniqueness is rooted in), liberalism has
displaced what determines what is good and bad and then acts
accordingly. This is why, as Kahn has persuasively claimed,
“[l]iberalism fails to understand evil for just the same reason that it
fails to understand love.”64 This is so because liberalism’s “horizon
of explanation is framed by reason, on the one hand, and personal
well-being, on the other. Between reason and interest, it can find
no third term.”65 As a result, liberalism has simultaneously
neutralised the performative instances of the self’s political
unconscious66 and critical attitude toward the legitimacy of legal
rules (or what Duns Scotus would call experentia interna). No
understand why Paul’s universalism is different from what is currently taking
place, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE TIME THAT REMAINS 44–58 and 88–112
(Patricia Delay trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter TIME THAT
REMAINS]; Agamben, The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in
Walter Benjamin in POTENTIALITIES 160–74 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans. & ed.,
Stanford Univ. Press 1999).
63. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 89.
64. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 53. In providing a theological
critique of liberalism’s “narrative of political progress” through an inquiry into
the “problem of evil,” Kahn compellingly suggests that the liberal doctrine may
be linked to the return to “Genesis one”, that is, to the condition of pure (and
sterile, I would add) contemplation in which man and woman found themselves
before the Fall (from which begins “Genesis two”). Only by exercising their
willpower, and thus choosing to act for the benefit of their own knowledge (and
in particular the knowledge of their finitude and death) and against the rational
law imposed from above, Adam and Eve broke with the Greek tradition and
became “human.” This means that, from a theological point of view, will (and
our active use of it) is what makes us human. If we unite this perspective to what
was mentioned in note 62, it becomes clear why, according to Kahn, “Rawls’
idea of reaching a knowledge of justice behind the veil of ignorance is the
symbolism of leaving this fallen world of particular concerns and returning to a
purer space of undifferentiated, equal individuals.” Id. at 98. For an introduction
on how the myth(s) of Genesis informed Western culture in terms of freedomto-will, see PAGELS, supra note 16; EVE AND ADAM (Kristen E. Kvam, Linda S.
Schearin & Valarie H. Ziegler eds., Indiana Univ. Press 1999); GARY A.
ANDERSON, THE GENESIS OF PERFECTION (Westminster John Knox Press 2001).
65. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN. supra note 40, at 98.
66. See, in particular, FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS
(Routledge 2002) (1981).
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wonder, then, why the term “post-national” was taken up by
Habermas,67 and why pluralist forms of PNG transcend state-based
patterns of legislation and political regulation or administration.
It seems to me to follow from these considerations that what
liberalism and its globalisation have thus targeted is humans’
political essence as expressed on the one hand by the will’s power
of assertion and denial, and on the other hand by the fact that no
one can act alone. The promoters of the uniformed Oikoumene, as
a (non-)dimension in which cultures and identities are innocent and
indifferent because they have been annihilated by the levelling and
conformist demands of the global (open) society, are fully aware
that the “fact that man is capable of action means that the
unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform
what is infinitely improbable [and that this] is possible only
because each man is unique . . . .”68 The shift from those who
willingly and politically act to “Human” who rationally and
interestingly behaves should be seen as a component of the broader
strategy to neutralise the boundlessness of action and the
unpredictability of the outcomes which have always characterised
human conduct. In this sense, if the public realm, as distinguished
from the private sphere, is the space of human appearance, and if
political power “is what keeps the public realm . . . between action
and speaking men, in existence,”69 it is anything but surprising that
the global-order project, with its soft-networked and post-national
web of social connectivity, is aimed at the nullification of modern
stated-based schemes of political and legal order.
In this sense, if we bear in mind that Ancient Greece believed
that the aforementioned idea of creation out of nothing was simply
67. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION (MIT Press
2002) (1998).
68. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 178.
69. Id. at 200. Arendt further clarifies that this type of power “preserves the
public realm and the space of appearance, and as such it is also the lifeblood of
the human artifice, which, unless it is the scene of action and speech, of the web
of human affairs and relationships and the stores engendered by them, lacks its
ultimate raison d’être.” Id. at 204.
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unconceivable,70 it becomes clear why liberalism and the
intangible (non-)dimension and illimitable potentialities prompted
by its universalization recall Aristotle’s behavioural “I-can”,71
rather than Schmitt’s active “I-will”.72 Notably, Aristotle, whose
definition of man as the living being who has λόγος has become
canonical in Western belief in man as animal rationale, challenged
the Platonic view that reason is incapable of “moving” things. This
was done through the promotion, in Agamben’s words, of “a
theory of potential and habit [that] is in truth a way for Aristotle to
introduce movement into being.”73 Kinēsis is indeed the
fundamental concept in Aristotelian metaphysics, while, not
surprisingly, stasis, as a state of exception in which the sovereign
suspends the validity of the norm with the aim of saving the legal
order unconventionally from its own death with a pure political act
(necessitas non habet legem), is that of Schmitt.74 Hence, it makes
70. Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and, more importantly, Zeno all believed
that nothing is absolutely new.
71. Audi has defined this faculty as the actor’s performative reasoning that
originates and evolves according to innumerable explicative propositions that
work as “object language formulations” of “the rules constitutive of the game in
which ‘want’ functions.” See ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION AND REASON
36–37 (Cornell Univ. Press 1993). On why Aristotle’s notion of deliberative
choice, as a tertium comparationis between reason and desire, cannot be defined
as “will,” see ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, 55–63. See also
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE MAN WITHOUT CONTENT 59–93 (Georgia Albert
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1999) (1994) [hereinafter MAN WITHOUT
CONTENT].
72. Agamben, who in trying to define a faculty claims that every time
“something is or is not ‘in one’s power’ . . . we are already in the domain of
potentiality,” would probably not agree with this distinction. See AGAMBEN,
TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 178. On Schmitt’s decisionism, see
Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
73. AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 95. Yet if we unite
this claim with what Agamben himself argues while further inquiring into
Aristotle’s concept of potentiality, which says that what is essential therein is the
“existence of non-Being,” it becomes clear that what the Aristotelian “I-can”
leads to is nothing but a zone of indistinction between “to be” and “not to be.”
See ON POTENTIALITY, supra note 62, 177–84, at 179. See also AGAMBEN,
HOMO SACER 46 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998)
(1993) [hereinafter HOMO SACER]; AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra
note 6, at 35–7.
74. The “divine conflict” between God and the crucified Jesus as described
in Moltmann’s The Crucified God may be considered the first Schmittian state
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perfect sense that, as Arendt carefully explains, Plato believed that
“human affairs . . . the outcome of action . . . should not be treated
with great seriousness.”75 In this sense, both Plato and Aristotle,
who “did not count legislating among the political activities,”76
may be seen as the forerunners of (liberal and economic) interest
theory.
While marking a totally new reappraisal of the matter through
the implementation of the pre-Christian view and negation of
willpower, Spinoza developed further what was claimed by Greek
philosophy. Spinozism may be viewed as the pre-modern
forerunner of the current essence of the globalising trend against
the constitutive force of the willing ego and the anthropological
and sociopolitical need for an authority that posits the law.77 This
seems to be further confirmed by the use of Spinoza in Deleuze’s
contemplative empiricism, which, as is well-known, is
characterised by the total disappearance of the subject and any idea

of exception in political theology from which Christianity, and hence the West
as we know it today, originated; see JÜRGEN MOLTMANN, THE CRUCIFIED GOD:
THE CROSS OF CHRIST AS THE FOUNDATION AND CRITICISM OF CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY 146, 154–55, and 162–63 (SCM Press 2002) (1973). See also supra
note 57. For present purposes it is extremely relevant to note that, while
introducing the faculty of will, Paul’s aforementioned revolution paradoxically
caused what Agamben has persuasively defined as the “messianic inversion of
the potential-act relation.” Paul was perfectly aware of the Greek opposition
between act and potentiality and effected this inversion by restoring the law’s
“dividing” principle to a state of pure potentiality in which the “non-normative
figure of the law” could emerge as “nomos no-longer-at-work.” In overcoming
the flaws of Löwith and Blumemberg’s notion of messianic time, Agamben
correctly clarifies that the effect of the Pauline katargēsis (the exceptional
condition law’s inoperativeness which Paul calls nomos pisteōs) should not be
confused with the eschaton, but should rather be compared with Schmitt’s state
of exception. See AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 63, and 88–
112. See also AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 73; AGAMBEN, STATE OF
EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2003, 2005).
75. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 185. Emphasis added.
See also id. at 195.
76. Id. at 194.
77. After having heard Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi reading Goethe’s
Prometheus, Lessing shouted the totalising “Hen kai pan!” and proudly claimed
to have turned into a Spinozist. See JAN ASSMANN, MOSES THE EGYPTIAN 139–
43 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998); ASSMAN, RELIGIO DUPLEX 2–3 (Polity Press
2014).
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of self-consciousness.78 Yet the turn to the universal capacity of
reason officially began, as Arendt and Kahn have pointed out, with
Kant. It is true that it was Duns Scotus who, in arguing for the
primacy of the will over that of the intellect, first distinguished
between the “natural” will, which, in Arendt’s words, “follows
natural inclinations, and may be inspired by reason as well as
desire,”79 and “free” autonomous will which, as the Will through
which God created the world ex nihilo, performs in total freedom
from external causations.
Kant utopistically dreamed of a perpetual (that is, totalising)
peace in which “[t]he subject is now to give to himself the
principle of his own being: reason.”80 The (liberal) function of the
“categorical imperative” (you must “act according to that maxim
whose universality as law you can at the same time will”81) is
therefore very clear: it is aimed at neutralising the performative
conflict that takes place within the will between velle and nolle and
whose essence has kept theologians and philosophers busy since
Paul’s Messianic revolution. Indeed, according to Kant, “will is
absolutely good [when] it is a will whose maxim, when made
universal law, can never conflict with itself.”82 This belief is not
only one of the main components of current economic theory and
the information it provides,83 but eventually led to all neo-Kantian
78. Life, according to Deleuze, “is pure contemplation without knowledge.”
See GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 213 (Hugh
Tomlinson & Graham Burchell trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1994) (1991). See
also id. at 43. Not surprisingly, this inactive idea of life brings us back to both
the aforementioned pre-Adam-and-Eve condition of “Genesis one” and the
notion of “potentiality” in Aristotelian metaphysics. On the similarities between
Deleuze and Aristotle, see Giorgio Agamben, Absolute Immanence in
POTENTIALITIES, supra note 62, at 220–239.
79. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 132.
80. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 59; see also KENNEDY, supra
note 30, at 58.
81. KANT, supra note 13, at 54.
82. Id.
83. Which, in Habermas’s words, “cannot be ‘true’ or ‘false’ [but has
rather] the status of conditional imperatives which may be deductively ‘valid’ or
‘invalid.’” See HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 52.
Emphasis added.
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forms of social analysis, such as that of von Kempski, according to
whom all social sciences, including jurisprudence, can be
explained through the dehumanized behavioural schemes offered
by mathematical economics.
If only in such an imperial system of uniformed behaviour,
basic equal rights and individual liberty (such as property and
contract rights) could be guaranteed, then it should not surprise
anyone that Kantian aesthetics is about the rise of a particular type
of “genius” who is paradoxically capable of creating his/her own
works “unconsciously.”84 Schmitt spotted this while arguing (not
without inconsistencies85) against the emergence of aesthetics as a
sign of the rationalisation of politics. Similarly, but with a different
aim, Arendt understood full well the essence of Kant’s fictio when
claiming that “[t]he Will in Kant is in fact ‘practical reason’ much
in the sense of Aristotle’s nous praktikos; it borrows its obligatory
power from the compulsion entered on the mind by self-evident
truth or logical reasoning.”86 Yet it is precisely the willing ego’s
essential conflict between its own affirmation and negation that
constitutes the “spark” of the active unique existence of humans in
anthropological and sociopolitical terms.
III. AGAINST INTERPRETATION?
Susan Sontag’s and Josef Esser’s accounts could not be more
opposed to each other. While the former tries to explain why the
84. Gadamer, who along with Paul Ricoeur was the leading postHeideggerian hermeneutical philosopher, rightly claimed that “Kant makes the
concept of genius serve his transcendental inquiry completely and does not slip
into empirical psychology” in the sense that his “transcendental reflection . . .
does not permit a philosophical aesthetics.” See HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 49, 51 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans.,
Bloomsbury 2004) (1975) [hereinafter TRUTH AND METHOD].
85. One of the most compelling critiques of Schmitt’s battle against the
aesthetics of liberalism and its shift from action to acting can be found in
Victoria Kahn, Hamlet or Hecuba: Carl Schmitt’s Decision, 83
REPRESENTATIONS 67–96 (2003).
86. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 63. For a recent
rehabilitation of Arendt’s “political action,” see Lucy Cane Hannah Arendt on
the Principles of Political Action, 14 EUR. J. POLITICAL THEORY 55 (2015).
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interpretative task is a misleading fictio through which the
interpreter replaces the original author (or artist, as Sontag writes),
the latter aims to demonstrate that it is only through a particular
type of (normative) interpretation that the “true” meaning of the
(legal) text may appear and perform. Both claims should be
investigated carefully.
A. The Arrogance of Interpretation
To try to interpret Sontag’s essay “Against Interpretation”, her
most famous work, first published in its entirety in 1966, is, per se,
already a mistake, considering that she specifically asks us to
abandon any interpretative desire when approaching the text. How
can we even try to interpret something that stands against any
interpretative attempt? If we follow Sontag’s indications strictly,
we should not even read what she wrote. Yet the mythical essence
and concrete existence of the act of interpretation have kept
humanists busy since the thinking faculty was discovered. This is
so because, as Arendt noted,87 what makes us think is what Kant
defined as “reason’s need.” To delve into this need seems,
however, impossible. Philosophers have tried to get a better
understanding of it since Anaxagoras, who around 440 B.C.
claimed that the mind has power over all things that have life and
is the source of all motion. Hence the explosive energy of Sontag’s
essay is that, in just under fifteen printed pages, it renders centuries
of anthropological, philosophical, metaphysical, ontological,
artistic, and legal inquiry absolutely obsolete and ridiculous. In this
sense, what is truly impressive is that Sontag was not an
anthropologist, a philosopher, or a lawyer, but a Jewish-American
intellectual and writer who had a long academic apprenticeship at
Berkley, Chicago, and Harvard. Her fight against modern nihilism

87. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 69. But see the whole
first volume as well.
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must therefore be understood as a fight from the outside, not from
within.
Sontag develops a powerful statement against what she
describes as “a conscious act of the mind which illustrates a certain
code, certain ‘rules’ of interpretation.”88 From this perspective,
“interpretation means plucking a set of elements . . . from the
whole work.”89 This is why, in her view, every interpretation
requires a translation.90 The question is, then, what is to be
translated, and into what do we translate it? This is a key question
if we are to understand the operability of the (non-)subject, that is
the dissolution of the author into the interpreter which occurs
between original presentation and re-presentation. In trying to
provide an answer, Sontag first claims that the “modern style” of
interpretation is structurally different from that of late classical
antiquity. Indeed, while, for instance, the Stoic desire for
interpretation was evinced “to reconcile the ancient texts to
‘modern’ demands,” the interpretative task of our own time does
nothing but “destroys.”91 That is to say, the modern style of
interpretation brings the “discrepancy between the clear meaning
of the text and the demands of (later) readers”92 to levels which
were unknown at the time of Philo of Alexandria and which
annihilate the constitutive force that led to the creation of what is
interpreted. In a sort of Derridean disruptive motion, the “modern
style of interpretation excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it
‘digs’ behind the text, to find a sub-text which is the true one.”93
From the perspective of legal theory, Sontag’s claim sounds
like a defence of positivism and its belief that the presence of what

88. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id. On this, see also GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at
401–23.
91. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 6.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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is non-legal is not necessary to make law properly legal.94 What
matters, then, is that, in doing so, the interpreter replaces the
original author by pushing aside what Sontag labels the “manifest”
content for the sake of the “latent” one which, through a clever
move, is given “true” meaning. Hence, according to Sontag,
interpretation can never claim to be innocent and pure: it always
implies a contingent fictio, which must be evaluated “within a
historical view of human consciousness.”95
From this perspective, interpretation is nothing but a
manipulative process of new production of content that aims to
overcome the limits of what one might call “historical distance.”
Indeed, Gadamer argued in 1964 that “[o]ur experience and
interpretation is obviously in no sense limited by the mens
auctoris.”96 Even more importantly, eleven years later he
maintained that “every translator is an interpreter,” and that despite
what happens between two people in conversation, any text
“speaks only through the other partner, the interpreter.”97 This is so
because “the interpreting word [is] the word of the interpreter
[because] assimilation is no mere reproduction or repetition of the

94. Hegel believed that there is in language always a superior, concealed
“un-said” or “never said” as the ultimate true meaning that may be explained
only in terms of language’s universality and that has to be ultimately linked to
the temporal process of self-negation. He would thus not agree with this view.
As Agamben noted while inquiring into the mystery and strength of the
Hegelian “unspeakable”, “[t]hat which is thus unspeakable, for language, is
none other than the very meaning, the Meinung, which, as such, remains
necessarily unsaid in every saying.” See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, LANGUAGE AND
DEATH 13 (Karen E. Pinkus & Michael Hardt trans., Minn. Univ. of Minn. Press
1991) (1982) [hereinafter LANGUAGE AND DEATH]; AGAMBEN, INFANCY AND
HISTORY (Liz Heron trans., Verso 2007) (1978). See also AGAMBEN, HOMO
SACER, supra note 73, at 21; AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at
27–87. See also infra note 155. I have discussed both (legal) positivism’s and
pragmatism’s political sin in Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note
7.
95. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 7.
96. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger and Marburg Theology in
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 198–211, at 209 (David E. Linge trans. & ed.;
Univ. of Cal. Press 2008) (1976) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS].
97. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 405. See also id. at
303, 307, and infra note 161.
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traditionary text; it is a new creation of understanding.”98 It seems,
then, that Sontag brought to its logical conclusion Gadamer’s claim
ten years before it was made, because, in her view, from being the
object, the content becomes, through the interpreter, the new
subject. When we embark on the interpretative task, we replace the
subject who created the object on which we are focussing our
efforts with the object itself, and to this object we then attribute the
specific meaning that we want: interpretation is therefore the way
through which we replace the original creator with ourselves
(subject X → object → subject Y). This can also be expressed by
saying that, in pursuing such a roadmap, which in legal theory
could not be more opposed to historical and systematic forms of
interpretation, the self-consciousness of the artist who created what
is interpreted is nullified and displaced from view. Any
interpretation displaces the sovereign will of the artist, or original
creator.
So the question arises: What should we do to stop this process
of dissolution? According to Sontag, whose only hope is that
“interpretation [will] not . . . always prevail,”99 we should all pay
more attention to the form rather than to the content of the object
of our interest.100 This is not surprising. Given that “excessive
stress on the content provokes the arrogance of interpretation,”101
the only activity by which the spectator (or interpreter) may respect
the presentification of the author’s self-consciousness is silent
investigation strictly into the form of what s/he created. This
means that, according to Sontag, we need to displace the content
from our view if we, as spectators, really want to find it.102 Yet it
98. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 489.
99. SONTAG, supra note 45, 10.
100. Id. at 12–13.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Even though he does not quote Sontag, Agamben turns her strategy
upside down and argues that it is instead the artist who should stop hoping to
find his/her certainty in the content of what s/he created. More precisely, in
inquiring into why “art leaves behind the neutral horizon of the aesthetic and
recognises itself in the ‘golden ball’ of the will to power,” Agamben argues that
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seems to me that this also means that we must turn into some sort
of Aristotelian non-interpreters;103 in pleading for a shift from the
analysis of the content to that of the form of what is interpreted,
Sontag is in truth asking us to deal only with a superficial and
secondary component of the author’s self-consciousness. Form
without content can never lead us to the discovery of the self. This
can only happen when the form actually becomes the content. And
as Agamben has persuasively argued while inquiring into the
theological moralisation of Western habits,104 this only happened
through the monastic development of the evangelicus canon as a
“form-of-living” (or forma vivendi)—in other words, when the
monastic rules of the patristic texts of the early centuries
prescribed a form-of-life that was the combination of a totalising
way of being and acting. Hence, even if we agree with Sontag
when she claims that “interpretation takes the sensory experience
of the work of art for granted,”105 and that this is the reason why
we should opt for a methodology of inquiry that preserves
transparency as “the highest, most liberating value in art,”106 we
cannot agree with her radical strategy on how to reach the

while the spectator “confronts absolute otherness in the work of art,” the artist
experiences “artistic subjectivity”—that is, a zone of indistinction between
“absolute essence” and “absolute abstract inessence.” In particular, this abstract
inessence is, in truth, the “pure creative-formal principle” which, “split from any
content,” “annihilates and dissolves every content in its continuous effort to
transcend and actualize itself.” This process, Agamben maintains, puts the artist
“in the paradoxical condition of having to find his own essence precisely in the
inessential, his content in what is mere form.” See AGAMBEN, MAN WITHOUT
CONTENT, supra note 71, at 2 and 54. Emphasis added. See also infra note 159.
103. Agamben has demonstrated, I think successfully, that in De
Interpretatione, “the letter, as interpreter of the voice, does not itself need any
other interpreter. It is the final interpreter . . . the limit of all interpretation.” See
The Thing Itself in AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, 27–38, at 37.
104. AGAMBEN, THE HIGHEST POVERTY and OPUS DEI, supra note 58, and
AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 27.
105. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 13.
106. Id.
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“luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they
are.”107
Sontag’s passionate account cannot be understood completely
without addressing another compelling essay of hers, “The
Anthropologist as Hero,”108 which unfortunately has not received
the same attention as “Against Interpretation.” Through an
(interpretative?) analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s formalism and
intellectual agnosticism, this second essay was written with the aim
of demonstrating how “[t]he unreliability of human experience
brought about by the inhuman acceleration of historical chance has
led every sensitive modern mind to the recording of some kind of
nausea, of intellectual vertigo.”109 The result of this trauma is
terrible: “[t]he other is experienced as a harsh purification of the
self.”110 Put bluntly, this means that in trying to bring together the
self-consciousness of the interpreter and the original creator, we
actually dissolve both. This is so because, in Sontag’s words,
“[m]odern sensibility moves between two seemingly contradictory
but actually related impulses: surrender to the exotic, the strange,
the other; and the domestication of the exotic, chiefly through
science.”111 In this sense, the most powerful statement made by
Sontag in “Against Interpretation” is probably the last one, in
which she claims that “[i]n place of a hermeneutics, we need an
erotics of art,”112 that is, an erotic of pure passion that acts as a
spark of life. There may be no doubt that, as we shall see, Esser
fully internalized the difference between interpretation and
hermeneutic, and that such difference was clarified by Gadamer at
the very beginning of his magnum opus.113 It seems, however, that
Sontag was not sufficiently aware of it.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 69–81.
109. Id. at 69.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 70.
112. Id. at 14.
113. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at xxvii–xxxv, 306,
and 403. Hermeneutics, with its comprehensive perspective, is not a “method”,
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B. The Value of Interpretation
I have introduced the significance of Esser’s account of the
interpretative task elsewhere.114 On that occasion, I claimed that
Esser has demonstrated that our comprehension, individualisation,
and further conviction of what the idea of law is, passes through
the decisive combination of the interpretation and judgment of
value of the positivistic content of the norm. I now wish to further
clarify what I meant, and contextualise it in light of this paper’s
claims.
Esser believes that the law is always the combination of two
types of jus: scriptum and non scriptum. As the (tangible) nature of
the former is well-known, Esser delves into the essence of the
latter to demonstrate that legal interpretation always acts as an
unwritten source of law. More than thirty years later, Supiot
similarly argued that the interpretation of the law is “not enclosed
within the letter of its texts but open to the spirit that informs it.”115
The energy that emanates from this notion of legal interpretation
requires us to investigate cautiously how this special unwritten
source influences the activity of jus-dicere—that is to say, how
legal interpretation leads us first to find the norm that fits our needs

but the study of the universalist linguistic process of signification. From an
ontological point of view, hermeneutics has therefore more in common with
semiotics, which can be defined as the science of signs, than with interpretation.
Yet hermeneutics and interpretation overlap significantly, as when Gadamer
claims that “[t]he genuine reality of the hermeneutical process seems . . . to
encompass the self-understanding of the interpreter as well as what is
interpreted.” See GADAMER, On the Problem of Self-Understanding in
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 96, 44–58, at 58. See also BERNARD
JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY (Deborah Charles Pubs 1997) (1985);
JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE (Deborah Charles Pubs
1988); COSTAS DOUZINAS, RONNIE WARRINGTON & SHAUN MCVEIGH,
POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE 92–110 (Routledge 1993); Maksymilian Del Mar,
System Values and Understanding Legal Language, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 29
(2008).
114. Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
115. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at 115.
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and then makes that norm capable of performing its regulative
instances through an act-ualising decision.
Esser accepts the challenge, and, as the central point of his
inquiry into the pre-comprehension of the method(s) of juridical
comprehension,116 describes several types of legal interpretation
(i.e., dogmatic, grammatical, systemic, historical, normative) with
the clear intent of uncovering the real essence of what is usually
defined as the ratio juris, the juridical reasoning that lies behind
the norm and that, if correctly interpreted, makes it suitable for
application. In this regard, Esser believes that the fact that a legal
disposition has a ratio means nothing more than that the
interpreter, standing at a privileged point such as that of Friedrich’s
Wander über dem Nebelmeer, is required to deal with its possible
sociopolitical applicative “horizons”117 (or “expectations”118). In
arguing so, Esser, who, unsurprisingly, quotes Habermas at the end
of the chapter, overcomes both liberalism’s and positivism’s
neutral automatism.
The starting point of Esser’s analysis is indeed that no one
would allow the creation and/or application of a norm seen as
“unjust” by society. What the interpreter has the duty to achieve is,
then, not “a” general comprehension of the norm, but the very best

116. The chapter on legal interpretation is, not accidently, the fifth in a series
of nine, cutting the whole opus into two equal parts, four chapters preceding it
and four following. See ESSER, supra note 45, at 112–37.
117. Id. at 136. The use of the term “horizon” is not accidental. Esser’s
research was profoundly influenced by that of Perelman, Heck, and, more
importantly, Gadamer, to whom in particular understanding is always a
(universal) process of mediation between the past horizon (composed of
prejudices and tradition) of the text and the present one of the interpreter. See
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 302–22, 334–50, and 455–
506; GADAMER, Man and Language in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra
note 96, 59–68, at 67 [hereinafter Man and Language]. For present purposes it is
quite relevant that Habermas, too, has inquired into Gadamer’s use of the
concept of the horizon to explain the hermeneutical task, in HABERMAS, LOGIC
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, 151–70.
118. ESSER, supra note 45, at 136. In describing Radbruch’s view, Cotterrell
explains why “[t]he jurist has to look beyond law’s technical efficiency to its
existence as an idea embodying cultural expectations,” Cotterrell, supra note 23,
at 21.
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comprehension of it according to the essence of a (delicate and yet
powerful) point of intersection between the jus scriptum of the
norm and the horizons upon which the sociopolitical acceptance of
its application inevitably depends. According to Esser, who is
obviously well-aware of the structural laws that inform humans’
capacity for understanding,119 the comprehension of the legal text
is therefore guided by an anticipation of the sense that informs the
court’s duty to judge. This is why, in his words, the precomprehension and choice of method to be followed in the process
of “juridical individualisation” is “the premise of an understanding
which may be used as a foundation for the [legal] decision.”120
This is how the interpreter is capable of checking the actual
fairness of the norm. Yet this means that the reasoning of the
interpreter, who deals with real people and real problems, must be
equal to that of the historical (that is, no longer present) legislator
because “the ratio legis can be ‘better understood’ by who applies
the norm.”121 To formulate the issue in this way means that the
interpreter undertakes a “critico-objective” revision of the norm
targeted with the aim of ascertaining whether or not “that” norm
can, and should, be used.
The last point warrants further comment. Esser makes it
incredibly clear that (legal) interpretation would be deprived of its
very sociopolitical meaning without the a priori recognition and
the a posteriori protection of the interpreter’s active power-to-will,
upon which the “freedom to valuate”122 the possible outcome(s) of
the application of the norm ultimately depends. In this sense, the
law-applying procedure, rooted in the decision-making one,
becomes nothing more than the fulfilment of “the duty to
regulate”123 which is fulfilled through what Esser labels the
119. On this, see in particular Gadamer, Man and Language, supra note 117,
at 59–68.
120. ESSER, supra note 45, at 135. My translation.
121. Id. at 114. My translation.
122. Id. at 115. My translation.
123. Id. at 117. My translation.

480

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

“interpretative praxis,”124 that is, the original signification and
further administration of its existential counterpart (the law). Such
a duty, it is worth noting, makes the interpreter the canon of the
“hermeneutical circle of the historical comprehension”125 of the
law: if law’s performance depends upon what the interpreter
understands of its given positivistic content—in other words, if the
law is the combination of both the norm and the decision as
previously mentioned—it is quite evident that the interpreter acts
as trait d'union between the political will that drafted the norm and
society at large. The interpreter is asked, therefore, to valuate the
facts (freely) in order to encapsulate them efficiently within a
normative framework, and then (freely) valuate and choose the
interpretive method that will render the law able to keep its
sociopolitical regulative promises. It is, then, the legal interpreter’s
double-faced decisive and active valuation that guides the law’s
performance. This is what Esser defines as the “normative purpose
of interpretation,”126 which, as he notes, is precisely what the
Enlightenment’s raison d’État, with its utopian belief in the
“objectification of interpretative rules and dogmatisation of the
[interpretative] method,”127 has tried to neutralise.
Thus, if we want the jurist to understand why s/he is the
protagonist in the process of “juridical individual-isation,” we
should free him/her from the influence of legal positivism’s claims
on the automatic self-applicability of the norm. No wonder, then,
that Esser, who rejects the fictio prompted by historico-legal
interpretation, opts for what could be defined as a decisive
“contextualised-normative” interpretation, or a type of
interpretation which “is necessarily guided by judgements of

124. Id. at 115. My translation.
125. Id. at 119. My translation.
126. Id. at 120. My translation.
127. Id. My translation. Esser’s critique of the dogmatic method of
interpretation is evidently rooted in that of Gadamer. See GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 339–41.
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value”128 over all possible applicative expectations. Indeed, it is
only through these performative judgments that the
“actualisation”129 of every sociopolitical and legal institution can
keep happening. What is relevant here is that this act-ualising
process cannot take place if we do not first recognise that the
decision in which the judgment is rooted is not mechanistically
“offered” by the norm itself: this is so because the norm cannot,
per se, “anticipate all estimative parameters [that are] necessary for
the application of the law.”130 On the contrary, such a decision can
only arise as the result of the problematic (that is, essential)
conflict that takes place within the sovereign power-to-will while
evaluating and deciding both “for” and “against” the
aforementioned horizons/expectations and concrete usability of the
norm.131 What matters for present purposes is thus that while
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics was specifically aimed at
overcoming the limits of Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s pure
individualism by (partly) displacing subjectivity132 from the
process of understanding and conferring authoritative value to our
prejudices,133 Esser’s theory of legal interpretation represents a
zone of intersection between them.
128. ESSER, supra note 45, at 127. My translation.
129. Id. at 128. My translation.
130. Id. My translation. See also id. at 135, where Esser argues that the jurist
“comprehends the given text . . . in terms of a directing model which has a
meaning according to his ‘satisfying’ decision”. My translation. Emphasis
added.
131. Which is why Esser maintains that “the path along the individualisation
of the law through interpretation is never linear . . . but is a path of alternatives
and hypotheses which . . . must be justified in the light of their possible
plausibility.” Any tentative attempt to achieve a mechanical (that is, positivistic,
systemic, etc.) interpretation of the norm is therefore deemed to be unsuccessful.
Id. at 131.
132. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 307–8, and 338;
GADAMER, Martin Heidegger, supra note 96, at 58. See, in comparison, infra
note 160. See also David E Linge’s Introduction to GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 96, at xii–xxvii.
133. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 278–318. See also
GADAMER, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem in PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 96, 3–17, at 12. See also George Duke, Gadamer
and Political Authority, 13 EUR. J. LEGAL THEORY 25 (2014).
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This is why Esser claims that the correspondence between the
norm and the decision will inevitably lead us to delve into the
“hermeneutical circle,” which “consists in the relationship between
formulations of problems and answers, to be intended as the
comprehension of the norm” which itself is rooted in the “prejudice over the necessity of discipline and possibility to solve
[conflicts].”134 If we turn the picture upside down and keep in mind
what was mentioned about the distinction between social rules and
legal norms, this means that the jurist cannot norm-alise our
choices and offer norm-ative guidance to human conduct (or, as
Paul would say, the jurist cannot act as a medium between the law
and the rule, or regula vitae135), and the law cannot solve social
conflicts, unless we first let the internal conflict between velle and
nolle manifest itself within us. Thus, the a priori essence of the
anthropological conflict that makes us human informs the a
posteriori sociopolitical existence of the law, which conversely
makes sense only in light of the former.136 Both conflicts
ultimately lead the legal interpreter to formulate a decision that is
seen as “objectively just”137 because of the subjective
contextualised-normative evaluation.
The value of (the correct method of) legal interpretation is,
therefore, very clear: given that, like any provisions, legal
provisions only make sense as part of a delicate (yet powerful)
performative/dispositive
narrative,
legal
interpretation’s
performative capacity decisively act-ualises the regulative
instances of our sociopolitical institutions. It makes them relevant
by linking their performance to what renders us unique. What is
increasingly lacking in our neorealist globalised constellation is
exactly this act-ualisation which, I contend, cannot re-take place if
what makes us human, namely the internal conflict between the
134.
135.
136.
137.

ESSER, supra note 45, at 133.
See supra note 47.
Id.
ESSER, supra note 45, at 136.
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will power of affirmation or negation, is not re-affirmed. The more
we cover the manifestation of this anthropological conflict, the
more all mechanical forms of post-national governance will
succeed in their dehumanising enterprise and displacing the jurist
from view.
IV. CONCLUSION
The contention, so well demonstrated by Whorf,138 that the
structures of language determine those of thought is testament to
the fact that language is the medium for human self-understanding
or, as Heidegger would say, and Gadamer, Esser, and Agamben
would all in their own ways confirm, that understanding is being(in-there).139 Consequently, as an act of meaning production,
interpretation plays a pivotal role in the present-ification of our
uniqueness, that is the volo me velle. It is in this sense that, in legal
theory, legal interpretation is the canon of the process through
which what makes us human (per-)forms its instances. Importantly,
law being an ideal object in constant need of a “corpus” to show
and prove its historical existence,140 legal interpretation is the point
of intersection between the active will of the jurist and law’s
normative presentification in ontological terms. This is why in the
courtroom, as in the liturgical tradition, interpretative
understanding leads to what Gadamer called the “third element in
the hermeneutical problem,”141 namely application, which is itself
presentification.

138. BRIAN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY (The MIT
Press 2012) (1956).
139. Consider, in particular, Gadamer’s argument that an “essential feature of
the being in language [is] its I-lessness. Whoever speaks a language that no one
understands does not speak,” in Gadamer, Man and Language, supra note 117,
at 65.
140. Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of “Depoliticization”, supra note 1, and
Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
141. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 318 and 338–50. See
also AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62 at 79–85.
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In light of the above discussion, I believe that the jurist may
defeat the nihilism that currently affects him/her and return to the
authority of which liberalism and its universalisation have deprived
him/her only if we, as lawyers, re-affirm the neglected sovereignty
of the will to (per-)form the self-understanding of our uniqueness
through the affirmation or negation of a future project. The ontosociopolitical need for the jurist’s function to give a normative
meaning to the signification of the power-to-will through legal
interpretation can be re-discovered and successfully protected only
if we first re-uncover the anthropological essence of homo
juridicus’s self-consciousness and sovereign activity in
existentially (per-)forming his/her decisions.
Arendt claimed that “the freedom of the will is relevant only to
people who live outside political communities.”142 On the contrary,
I believe that the very notion of our sociopolitical liberty is
meaningless without recognition of the anthropological function of
the sovereign power-to-will. This belief leads me to a subsequent
suggestion. That recent public and private (household and
corporate) financial crises have revealed an a priori and more
profound political crisis is not a mystery. What is less clear,
however, is that the politico-ideological gridlock that currently
affects the decision-making processes of Western democracies143
(consider, for instance, what has happened over the last few years
in Greece, Portugal, Italy, and the U.S.) and that, not
coincidentally, experimentalist forms of PNG aim to overcome, is
rooted in the crisis of what makes us human: our will and power to
decide both “for” and “against” a future project (and, thus,
142. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 199. See also ARENDT,
LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 56, at 145, when it is claimed that political
freedom “is the very opposite of ‘inner freedom’”. Not surprisingly, Arendt was
of the opinion that Eichmann’s evilness was “banal.” See ARENDT, EICHMANN
IN JERUSALEM, supra note 40.
143. Which was “forecasted” by Schmitt in THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., MIT Press 1988) (1923, 1926). See also
CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. & ed., Duke
Univ. Press 2004) (1932, 1958).
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something and/or someone) and then actively perform our volitions
accordingly. Importantly, as I have argued here, such an existential
crisis cannot be understood completely without a critique of the
economic theory of democracy on the one hand and of liberalism’s
limits on the other (and in particular its utopian belief in the
perpetual inclusive capacity of endless negotiations and in the
possibility of freeing law from the metaphysic of the will). In
particular, along with Rawls’s dehumanised veil of ignorance,
which should inform the contractual paradigm of reasonable
political discourse, Habermas’s belief that the “rational character
of parliamentary deliberations is to be sought primarily . . . in the
fair balancing of interests, the clarification of ethical selfunderstanding, and the moral justification of regulations” is one of
the maximum expressions of liberalism’s challenge to our
uniqueness. This is so because it leads to the possibility of
“subjectless forms” of communicative (non-)action that “regulate
the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation in such a way
that their fallible results enjoy the presumption of being
reasonable.”144
In the liquid and unstable post-national framework, the law is
incapable of keeping its sociopolitical regulative promises. What is
important is that we do not need it to keep these promises.145 This
is what, as mentioned in the introduction of this study, global
(non-)law is about. The fact that, over the last ten years, softnetworked channels of PNG have branched out in new directions,
sparking novel business models of rational behaviour that
challenge the forms through which the politicisation and
juridification of modernity have taken place, is anything but a
coincidence. Gustav Radbruch’s authoritarian claim that “[i]f
nobody can ascertain what is just, somebody must determine what

144. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 3, at 180 and 301
respectively. Emphasis added.
145. See supra note 47.
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shall be legal”146 makes no sense in the post-national
“constellation.” This is so because the anthropological function of
positing the law, which, in Arendt’s words, is aimed at erecting
“boundaries and establish[ing] channels of communication
between men whose community is continually enlarged by the new
men born into it,”147 is deprived of its meaning. The promoters of
soft-networked forms of PNG are used to claim that they may
better overcome the political gridlocks and ideological clefts that
characterise classic modes of regulation, and more importantly,
prevent democratic systems of accountability from achieving the
structural reforms they need. Although this claim sounds
fascinating, I believe that the strategy by which liquid mechanisms
of PNG operate and transcend state-based patterns of government
can only be fully understood if we address why law’s sociopolitical
instances become completely obsolete within the global-order
(non-)dimension. This can be done only if, in light of the
aforementioned distinction between law and rule, we first
comprehend that the dehumanised scenario is characterised by
rules, not laws, that inform behavioural schemes of motion.
It is in this sense that the liberal global-order project threatens
what makes us human—the agent-revealing constitutive force as
expressed by the will’s oscillation between velle and nolle, and,
balancing that, the anthropological and sociopolitical role that this
force has in the formation and protection of our self-consciousness.
By imposing on us standardised apolitical schemes of interconnected mechanical behaviour, the global Oikoumene targets the
individual’s power of assertion and denial as expressed by the
will’s power of affirmation and negation; this is (per-)formed
through the boundlessness and unpredictability of (political)
action. Arendt suggests that the “impossibility of foretelling” the
consequences of human conduct finds its maximum expression in
146. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 163 (Müller Jur.Vlg.C.F.
2011) (1969). Also quoted by HAYEK, supra note 23, at 212 and 323.
147. ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 6, at 465.

2015]

“AGAINST INTERPRETATION”?

487

the act of making promises as “the only alternative to a mastery
which relies on domination of one’s self and rule over others;”148 if
she is right in that assertion, then the preference for the common
law tradition expressed in the WTO’s Doing Business reports149—
that is, for a tradition in which promises are usually not legally
binding150—becomes even clearer.
Unfortunately, given that “[t]he liberal will is fundamentally
without content” and that “the end of liberalism is to create a form
of public discourse in which [the differences in cultural norms]
would have no significance,”151 the totalising strategy of the liberal
global-order project leads us to a sort of Deleuzian contemplative
form of “immanent life” without knowledge. This is a pre-Adamand-Eve contemplative condition in which the original λόγος
mentioned by John 1:1 (which means both reason and speech) has
no limit, or a Kantian dehumanised universe of harmonic reason
and perfect (because mechanical) social coordination that
transcends the imperfections and contradictions of our empirical
world(s). This is what Agamben meant in claiming that “the
planetary petty bourgeoisie is probably the form in which
humanity is moving toward its own destruction.”152 Despite its aim
of achieving a perfect rule-of-law-order away from the chaos and
anarchy that affect the homo homini lupus condition of the state of
nature, universalised liberalism produces instead a sort of “global
Eden,” or “intangible open” in which we do not have a sense of our
living experience because we neither come to birth nor die as
148. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 244.
149. I have investigated this preference further in Siliquini-Cinelli, supra
note 1.
150. This general doctrine, along with its exceptions, are compellingly
investigated by Martin Hogg in PROMISES AND CONTRACT LAW 428–50
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
151. KAHN, LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra note 5, respectively at 16 and
33.
152. AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 65. Agamben,
who as quoted compares the imperial trend of the global economy to that which
characterises the Hell, further maintains that current “politics assume[s] . . . the
form of an iokonomia, that is, of a governance of empty speech over bare life.”
See AGAMBEN, id. at 72.
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“someone”;153 this is a sort of Kojèvean post-historical (that is,
animal) condition in which not only miracles are exceptions, but
even time and space, as well love and evil, happiness and
suffering, violence and sacrifice, friend and enemy no longer exist,
and in which everyone can be (and in fact, is) everyone else
because its (non-)human participants are moved merely by
incentives154 according to quantitative (rather than qualitative)
models of interest, and then evaluated and divided according to
their behavioural virtues rather the decisions they make.
In such a (non-)dimension of objective regularities rather than
of subjective irregularities, of language rather than languages,155 of
novels rather than tragedies, (non-)humans are completely
interchangeable and replaceable (as is the case, not surprisingly,
for the channels through which soft-networked forms of PNG
operate) because their lives will no longer be sacer, and even the
153. The rationalistic and aspatial ius soli is already producing this result.
154. Habermas speaks of “stimulus-response behavior” in On the Logic of
Social Sciences and of “impulses” throughout Between Facts and Norms. There
are two reasons for this. First, Habermas believes that humans can define their
own identities by rationally following their interests. Second, even if he tries to
draw a fine line between “political public sphere” and “civil society” through a
conception in which the latter “institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on
questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres”
and which “can acquire influence in the public sphere,” his notion of the public
sphere underestimates, on the one hand, the (anthropological more than
sociopolitical) distinction among private, public, and social realms so welldescribed by Arendt, and on the other hand, Hayek’s warning against the
instrumentalisation of the term “social.” See HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 44, and BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 3,
329–87, at 367 and 373; ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, 22–78;
HAYEK, supra note 23, at 241–43. See also JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). See also Thomas
Piketty’s critique of the scientific methods used by modern economists in
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 574–75 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Belknap Press 2013) (2014). Finally, see supra note 50-52.
155. I refer here to when Habermas, borrowing from theologicophilosophical inquiry, claims that “[o]nly by destroying the particularities of
languages . . . does reason live in language.” HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 144.
It seems, then, that liberalism’s linguistic sin is that it has never understood that
“a word [is not] an instrument, like the language of mathematics, that can
construct an objectified universe of beings that can be out at our disposal by
calculation.” See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 473. See
also supra note 94.
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act of killing will lose its political and normative meaning and
become a sterile and neutral behavioural outcome (as it already is,
not coincidentally, in criminal law every time the mens rea is
displaced from view).156 This is why, from claiming to be the only
feasible solution to the sociopolitical challenge posed by cultural
pluralism, universalised liberalism has imposed a form-of(non-)living in Agambenian terms which in fact annihilates our
uniqueness through the imposition of procedural rather than
substantial truths which, paraphrasing Nietzsche, we may say
forces humans to place “[their] behaviour under the control of
abstractions.”157 Thus the liberal global-order project requires us to
master the problem of law in its original structure, in the
connubium between its essential uncanny presence and existential
performative instances. This cannot be done without asking why,
building on Benjamin, Agamben argues that in an age such as ours,
in which the exception has become the rule, instead of claiming
that “there is nothing outside the law” we should rather understand
that “there is nothing inside the law.”158
The lesson to be learnt then is that, if we agree with Agamben
when he observes that “[i]t is, in every being that exists, the
possibility of not-being that silently calls for our help,”159 then we
156. This is so because the co-essential possibility of being killed would be
seen as an existentially tolerable condition. Heidegger would say that the
“merely-living,” as opposed to Dasein as “Being-in-the-world” or “Being-thethere” or “Being-in-motion,” does not die, but just ceases to live. On this, see
Agamben, Language and Death, supra note 94.
157. Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense in
PHILOSOPHY AND TRUTH 84 (Daniel Breazeale trans., Humanities Press 1990)
(1873). David Dyzenhaus suggests that “political liberalism . . . seeks to ban
truth from politics,” in supra note 5, at 231.
158. AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 170. “The entire
planet,” Agamben further maintains, “has now become the exception that law
must contain in its ban,” id. See also AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY,
supra note 6, at 113.
159. AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 31. In light of
what was discussed in Section II, it is of pivotal interest that Agamben believes
that this need for help finds its maximum expression in the artist, that is in the
creator par excellence. The artist, Agamben claims, is he who “remains on [the]
side of himself [because] condemned forever to dwell, so to speak, beside his
reality.” Hence, the artist is the real “man without content, who has no identity
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should say that, as lawyers, we have the precise duty to do our part
not only in understanding why this help is required, but also in
providing it. The central question is, of course, how. In my
opinion, the best way to meet this challenge is by uncovering the
connection between the existential component of jus-dicere and,
paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas, the anthropological and
sociopolitical essence of the voluntas vult se velle et nolle, that is,
of the “will which wills itself to will and nill.” The combination of
the two creates a powerful zone of indistinction within legal
theory, namely the unity of consciousness.
This can be achieved only through the promotion of a call for
action, which implies a “narrative of the subject, an account of the
deliberative process by which the subject chose and thus of the
values and principles which he affirmed in that process.”160 Yet, as
Arendt taught us, action cannot be built on contemplation. Hence,
if legal texts are central to the operativity of the (rule of) law, and
if we agree with Gadamer that “[a] person who is trying to
understand a text is always projecting”161 and with Esser’s account
of the role of the act-ualising decision in the interpretative task,
then we should admit that the performative character of legal
interpretation as described in this paper depends upon the restitutio
in integrum of the will as principium individuationis. As this paper
has shown, this ‘will’ ought not be confused with the liberal
prototype, which as Kahn as set out, is “fundamentally without

[other] than a perpetual emerging out of the nothingness of expression and no
other ground than this incomprehensible station on this side of himself.”
AGAMBEN, MAN WITHOUT CONTENT, supra note 71, at 55. See also AGAMBEN,
The Author as Gesture in THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 61–72.
160. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 46. See also KAHN, POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 41, at 125–52. Kahn has introduced the need for a
normative inquiry into the process of self-exploration in THE CULTURAL STUDY
OF LAW (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999).
161. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 279. See also
ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 57, in which it is explained why
the ability to act requires imagination.
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content”;162 rather the will we should put back on stage is the
faculty through which we actively choose the determination(s) of a
future project while setting into motion the constitutive process of
our uniqueness.

162. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra note 5, at 16.

